With the implementation of the first five-year plan, the industrialization of the Soviet Union boomed until the late 1920s. From 1928 to 1933 alone, the number of workers in the large industry doubled. The population of the cities grew tremendously quickly. Agriculture did not keep up with this development. Millions of small farmers were forced to work on hunger wages with the kulaks (big farmers) like soccage farmers. They could hardly cultivate enough for themselves and their families on their small plots. Grain production in 1926 only reached 91% of the pre-war level. For cities, only 37% of pre-war grain (before 1914) was available. The collectivization of agriculture (collective farms) was the ultimate way to be able to supply the grown population. Lenin had already pointed this out in 1918 and the XV. CPSU Party Congress passed a corresponding decision in 1927.

In January 1933 there were already 200,000 collective farms and 5,000 statal crops and cattle farms in the Soviet Union. The collective farms comprised 70% of the agricultural area. Instead of 500 to 600 million poods of commodity grain (grain beyond the farmer's private demands), 1,200 to 1,400 million poods were now available. The economic basis of the kulaks, the exploitation of the small farmers, was shattered because the small farmers now had an alternative. Many kulaks had entered the collective farms themselves. The USSR had become the country harbouring the largest agricultural enterprises of the world.

How did the 1932/33 famine come about?
On the one hand, the weather conditions in Ukraine in the summer of 1932 were particularly unfavorable.
However, that was not the main cause. The main cause was the neglect of the party's efforts to convince small and medium-sized farmers of collectivization. Instead of promoting the voluntary union as demanded by Lenin, the party's bureaucratic cadres had used coercion. That was grist to the mills of the kulaks, who agitated against collectivization. In the late 1920s there were uprisings against collectivization in western Ukraine. Stalin condemned this practice in his speech "Dizzy with Success" (March 1930).
("Collective farms must not be established by force. That would be foolish and reactionary. The collective-farm movement must rest on the active support of the main mass of the peasantry. (...) But what actually happens sometimes? Can it be said that the voluntary principle and the principle of taking local peculiarities into account are not violated in a number of areas? No, that cannot be said, unfortunately. We know, for example, that in a number of the northern areas of the consuming zone, where the conditions for the immediate organisation of collective farms are comparatively less favourable than in the grain-growing areas, attempts are not infrequently made to replace preparatory work for the organisation of collective farms by bureaucratic decreeing of the collective-farm movement, paper resolutions on the growth of collective farms, organisation of collective farms on paper — collective farms which have as yet no reality, but whose “existence” is proclaimed in a heap of boastful resolutions.)
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1930/03/02.htm

The collectivization was very attractive to many small farmers because it was the only thing that offered a way out of ruin.
Kulaks and popes incited the farmers to kill their cattle before joining the collective farm, as they would be taken away from them anyway which was not true. But a lot of cattle were lost and missing, both as food and as cattle for work.
Kulaks and popes called for harvesting only what was needed personally and for the seeds. The grain was not harvested.
Eventually, many kulaks went to the kolkhoz themselves, took on managerial posts, and opposed the grain levy that fed the urban population. The state resorted to forced collections.

The vast majority of the reactionary kulaks were hostile to the building of socialism.
Wherever they calculated an opportunity, they switched from organized, stubborn resistance and the mass sabotage of the harvest and food supply to open resistance with rioting and insurrection.
The starved and murdered for whom they are responsible are today counted among the "victims of Stalinism", which are said to comprise "7 to 10 million deaths" for the part of the victims of the 1932/33 famine. It is striking that there is no mention of such casualties in post-war Western history books.

The Kharkov district was the most affected by the famine. According to Wikipedia, there were 45,000 starvation victims in it. If you extrapolate this number, there are a maximum of 500,000 deaths in Ukraine. In 1926, 23.2 million people lived in Ukraine. In 1937 there were 22.2 million. If the horror count of 7 to 10 million starvation victims in 1932/33 were correct, it would have required a population increase of 70 percent in just 10 years!

The Holodomor myth is part of a general anti-communist campaign to criminalize communism.